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[777] 
Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses 
Bradley Scott Shannon* 
In Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court, the Supreme Court created 
a scheme for the enforcement of contractual forum-selection clauses in federal courts. 
But the Court’s scheme, which relies heavily on the use of federal venue transfer 
statutes and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, is highly problematic. The relevance 
of federal venue statutes for this purpose seems questionable, and the use of such 
statutes results in an unduly complicated analysis that fails to capture all relevant 
considerations in this context. The Court’s reliance on federal venue statutes also 
prevents state courts faced with similar issues from utilizing the same mode of analysis. 
Simply enforcing forum-selection clauses by their terms through a motion to dismiss 
would result in a simpler, more just, and more universal solution to this problem. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. I thank the organizers of this Symposium, 
particularly Professors Scott Dodson and Stephen Sachs, for graciously inviting me to participate; the 
University of California Hastings College of the Law, particularly Professors Mary Kay Kane and 
Richard Marcus, for hosting this Symposium and for serving as moderators; and the Board of Editors 
of the Hastings Law Journal, particularly Emily Goldberg Knox, Kyla Kessler Rowe, and Rob Taboada 
for their hard work and hospitality. 
Shannon-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2015 5:08 PM 
778 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:777 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 778 
I.  The Supreme Court’s Decision in ATLANTIC MARINE ......................... 779 
II.  A Critique of the Approaches Taken by the Supreme Court 
 and Argued by the Amicus ................................................................. 782 
III.  A Better Way: A Motion to Dismiss for Enforcement of the 
Forum-Selection Clause .................................................................... 792 
Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Atlantic Marine 
Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court1 raises a number of interesting 
and important questions, many of which this Symposium addresses. This 
Article, though, will confine itself to the question specifically before the 
Court in that case: how should a contractual forum-selection clause2 be 
enforced when one of the parties commences an action in a different 
court?3 Though seemingly mundane, this question is important,4 and yet it 
has somehow defied a simple solution. 
The Supreme Court, of course, has already answered this question, 
at least as it was presented in Atlantic Marine: When venue in a federal 
district court, ignoring the existence of any forum-selection clause, is 
proper under the applicable federal venue statute, a forum-selection 
clause generally may be enforced by a motion to transfer venue under 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a),5 albeit with modifications to the analysis used to 
transfer venue in the absence of such a clause.6 But as a normative 
 
 1. 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013). 
 2. Generally speaking, a “forum-selection clause” is a “contractual provision in which the parties 
establish the place (such as the country, state, or type of court) for specified litigation between them.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 770 (10th ed. 2014). Such clauses (or agreements) can take a variety of 
forms. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 Hastings 
L.J. 643, 645–49 (2015) (discussing various types of forum-selection agreements). 
 3. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575 (“The question in this case concerns the procedure that is 
available for a defendant in a civil case who seeks to enforce a forum-selection clause.”). 
 4. See 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3803.1 (3d ed. 
2007) (“Contractual provisions undertaking to provide where a suit may be brought in disputes arising 
out of the agreement are not uncommon. These provisions first were seen in shipping and other 
international commercial transactions, but now appear in contracts of every description and, if 
anything, are being used with greater frequency.”). 
 5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have 
been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”).  
 6. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575. In dicta, the Court strongly implied that when venue is 
improper, such a clause may be enforced by a motion to dismiss (or possibly transfer) under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1406 and/or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). See id. at 577. The Court further opined that 
when such a clause points to a state or even a foreign forum, it may be enforced by a motion to dismiss 
for forum non conveniens. See id. at 580.  
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matter, is the scheme created by the Atlantic Marine Court the best 
approach? 
No. This Article will argue that motions to transfer venue under 
28 U.S.C. § 1404, motions to dismiss or transfer for improper venue 
under 28 U.S.C. § 14067 and/or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(3),8 motions to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens,9 and (as was argued by Professor Stephen E. Sachs as 
amicus) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6)10 are not the best—or even 
appropriate—vehicles for enforcing a forum-selection clause. Rather, a 
forum-selection clause should be enforced simply by a motion to dismiss 
under the parties’ contract—that is, for enforcement of the forum-
selection clause itself. 
The remainder of this Article consists of three main parts. Part I 
briefly summarizes the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Marine and 
the various arguments made therein. Part II criticizes the approach taken 
by the Court as well as that proposed by the amicus. Finally, Part III 
presents an alternative approach—a motion to dismiss for enforcement 
of the forum-selection clause—and seeks to show that this approach is 
normatively superior. 
I.  The Supreme Court’s Decision in ATLANTIC MARINE 
In Atlantic Marine, the parties—J-Crew Management, Inc., a Texas 
corporation and Atlantic Marine Construction Co., Inc., a Virginia 
corporation—entered into a contract for work on a construction project 
in Texas.11 The contract provided, inter alia, that any action between the 
 
 7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 
 8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Incidentally, in this Article, “Rule” or “Rules” refers to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 9. See Black’s Law Dictionary 770 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “forum non conveniens” as “[t]he 
doctrine that an appropriate forum—even though competent under the law—may divest itself of 
jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it appears that the action should 
proceed in another forum in which the action might also have been properly brought in the first 
place”). See also Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429–30 (2007) 
(discussing this doctrine generally). 
 10. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Though the Atlantic Marine Court characterized Professor 
Sachs’ argument in terms of Rule 12(b)(6), see infra text accompanying notes 27–29, his argument in 
fact referred to Rules 12(c) and 56 as well as 12(b)(6). See Brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12–27, Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929) 
[hereinafter “Sachs Brief”]. Though motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, for judgment on the 
pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)), for summary judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, as well as motions 
for judgment as a matter of law, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, represent different ways of contesting (or 
perhaps enforcing) claims and certain defenses, they are related in that the standard for each is 
essentially the same. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986) (equating 
the standard for summary judgment with that of judgment as a matter of law). Accordingly, this 
Article will use “Rule 12(b)(6)” to refer to all such motions. 
 11. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575. 
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parties relating to the contract “shall be litigated in the Circuit Court for the 
City of Norfolk, Virginia, or in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division.”12 Nonetheless, following 
a dispute regarding payment, J-Crew—in apparent contravention of the 
parties’ forum-selection clause—commenced an action against Atlantic 
Marine in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas.13 In 
response, Atlantic Marine moved to dismiss the action for improper 
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)14 and/or Rule 12(b)(3),15 or, 
alternatively, to transfer the action to the venue specified in the parties’ 
contract (the Eastern District of Virginia) under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).16 
Because venue, without regard to the forum-selection clause, was 
proper in the Western District of Texas under the applicable venue 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b),17 the Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
proper procedure for enforcing the forum-selection clause where a federal 
forum is available is a motion to transfer venue pursuant to § 1404(a).18 
But the Court strongly implied that if venue had been improper in the 
district where the action was commenced (again, without regard to the 
forum-selection clause), such a clause could be enforced by a motion to 
dismiss or possibly transfer venue under § 1406(a) and/or Rule 
12(b)(3).19 The Court further opined that when a forum-selection clause 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 576. 
 14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2012) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying 
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such 
case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”).  
 15. Rule 12(b)(3) provides for the assertion, by preanswer motion, of the defense of improper 
venue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). 
 16. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576. See § 1404(a). 
 17. Section 1391(b) (“Venue in General”) provides: 
A civil action may be brought in— 
  (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the 
State in which the district is located; 
  (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the 
claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or 
  (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this 
section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal 
jurisdiction with respect to such action.  
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Supreme Court concluded that venue in the Western District of Texas was 
proper because this was a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving 
rise to the plaintiff’s claims occurred. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576 n.1 (“Venue was otherwise 
proper in the Western District of Texas because the subcontract at issue in the suit was entered into 
and was to be performed in that district.”). 
 18. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575. 
 19. Id. at 577 (“Section 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) allow dismissal only when venue is ‘wrong’ or 
‘improper.’”). 
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points to a state or foreign court, it may be enforced by a motion to 
dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.20 
Although the Court found that § 1404(a) was “the appropriate 
provision to enforce the forum-selection clause in this case,” it added that 
certain analytical “adjustments” are required when the transfer motion is 
“premised” on such a clause:21 
  First, the plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no weight. Rather, as the 
party defying the forum-selection clause, the plaintiff bears the burden 
of establishing that transfer to the forum for which the parties 
bargained is unwarranted. . . .  
  Second, a court evaluating a defendant’s § 1404(a) motion to 
transfer based on a forum-selection clause should not consider 
arguments about the parties’ private interests. . . .22  
  As a consequence, a district court may consider arguments about 
public-interest factors only. . . .23  
  Third, when a party bound by a forum-selection clause flouts its 
contractual obligation and files suit in a different forum, a § 1404(a) 
transfer of venue will not carry with it the original venue’s choice-of-
law rules—a factor that in some circumstances may affect public-
interest considerations.24 
The Court repeatedly indicated that “[w]hen the parties have agreed to a 
valid forum-selection clause, a district court should ordinarily transfer 
the case to the forum specified in that clause.”25 But under certain 
 
 20. Id. at 580 (“[T]he appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a state or 
foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”). 
 21. Id. at 581.  
 22. Id. at 582. Under a more typical § 1404(a) analysis, such private interests include,  
“relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for 
attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; 
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other 
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” 
Id. at 581 n.6 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981)). See also id. at 582 
(“When parties agree to a forum-selection clause, they waive the right to challenge the preselected forum as 
inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation.”). 
 23. Id. at 582. “Public-interest factors may include ‘the administrative difficulties flowing from 
court congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; [and] the 
interest of having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law.’” Id. at 581 n.6 
(quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6). 
 24. Id. at 582. 
 25. Id. at 581. See also id. (observing that a “valid” forum-selection clause “represents the parties’ 
agreement as to the most proper forum” (quoting Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 
22, 31 (1988)), and that the enforcement of such a clause, “bargained for by the parties, protects their 
legitimate expectations and furthers vital interests of the justice system” (quoting Stewart, 487 U.S. at 
33 (Kennedy, J., concurring))); id. at 583 (“When parties have contracted in advance to litigate 
disputes in a particular forum, courts should not unnecessarily disrupt the parties’ settled expectations. 
A forum-selection clause, after all, may have figured centrally in the parties’ negotiations and may 
have affected how they set monetary and other contractual terms; it may, in fact, have been a critical 
factor in their agreement to do business in the first place.”). 
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circumstances, which the Court termed “extraordinary,” a motion to 
transfer venue in this context properly may be denied.26 
Professor Sachs, as amicus, argued that a forum-selection clause 
should not be enforced by a motion to transfer or dismiss under § 1404, 
§ 1406, or Rule 12(b)(3), but rather by a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6).27 But because Atlantic Marine “did not file a motion under Rule 
12(b)(6), and the parties did not brief the Rule’s application to this case 
at any stage in this litigation,” the Court declined to consider it.28 The Court 
added, though, that “[e]ven if a defendant could use Rule 12(b)(6) to 
enforce a forum-selection clause, that would not change [its] conclusions 
that § 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) are not proper mechanisms to enforce a 
forum-selection clause and that § 1404(a) and the forum non conveniens 
doctrine provide appropriate enforcement mechanisms” in this case.29 
II.  A Critique of the Approaches Taken by the  
Supreme Court and Argued by the Amicus 
As is true of most cases, the Atlantic Marine Court might have been 
somewhat constrained by the manner in which the enforcement of the 
forum-selection clause was asserted and argued by the parties. Moreover, 
both the Court and the parties might have been constrained to some 
extent by Supreme Court precedent.30 Regardless, there appear to be 
several problems with the approach taken by the Court in this case, 
problems that raise concerns about its propriety.31 And most of these 
 
 26. Id. at 581. See also id. at 583 (“In all but the most unusual cases . . . ‘the interest of justice’ is 
served by holding parties to their bargain.”). 
 27. See id. at 580. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 581; id. at 580 n.4 (“We observe, moreover, that a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), unlike a 
motion under § 1404(a) or the forum non conveniens doctrine, may lead to a jury trial on venue if 
issues of material fact relating to the validity of the forum-selection clause arise. Even if Professor 
Sachs is ultimately correct, therefore, defendants would have sensible reasons to invoke § 1404(a) or 
the forum non conveniens doctrine in addition to Rule 12(b)(6).”). 
 30. In particular, the Court seemed to be heavily influenced by its earlier decision in Stewart, a case 
in which the parties took essentially the same approach to the enforcement of a forum-selection clause as 
was taken by the parties in Atlantic Marine. Id. at 578 (“Our holding also finds support in Stewart . . . .”). 
 31. To be clear (and to narrow the areas of disagreement), this Article does not take issue with 
the Court’s conclusion that venue was proper in the district in which the action was commenced for 
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1404—a conclusion that seems correct in any event—because (as will be 
argued) the propriety of venue is essentially irrelevant to the question of how a forum-selection clause 
ought to be enforced (understanding that improper venue can lead to a dismissal on that basis as well). 
Similarly, the Article takes no issue with the Court’s conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 1406 and Rule 
12(b)(3) were not proper vehicles for enforcing the forum-selection clause at issue in this case, though 
not because venue was proper, but rather, as will be shown, because the use of those provisions suffers 
from many of the same problems as does § 1404. Finally, the Article does not disagree with the Court’s 
judgment or its insinuation that this action should not be litigated in the Western District of Texas; the 
disagreement rather is with its means of enforcing the forum-selection clause. 
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problems relate to the Court’s use of federal transfer of venue statutes 
(at least as a starting point) to enforce a forum-selection clause. 
Simply as a matter of statutory interpretation, it is unclear why either 
§ 1404 or § 1406 should be regarded as having any applicability or even 
relevance in this context. Both of these statutes are located in a portion 
of the U.S. Code relating to venue,32 and nothing in the text of these 
statutes speaks of forum-selection clauses or the enforcement of forum-
selection clauses.33 The presence or absence of a forum-selection clause 
is also not included among the “private” or “public” interest factors 
typically used by courts in connection with these statutes to determine 
whether an action should be transferred or dismissed.34 This is not 
surprising, for as the history of these statutes makes clear, their sole 
purpose is to provide for the possibility of a transfer to another federal 
court, rather than a dismissal, under circumstances primarily relating to 
inconvenience,35 that previously warranted a dismissal under the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens or required a dismissal for improper venue.36 The 
better reading of these statutes in fact suggests that they are applicable 
only in the absence of a forum-selection clause, a contractual agreement 
that is seemingly designed to take the issue of venue off the table. 
Incidentally—lest there be any confusion on this point—the recent 
amendment to § 1404(a) did nothing to alter this interpretation. Pursuant 
to the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011,37 
§ 1404(a) now permits a district court to transfer an action not only to 
any district “where it might have been brought”—that is, to another 
district in which venue and personal jurisdiction would have been 
 
 32. See 28 U.S.C. ch. 87 (“District Courts; Venue”) (encompassing §§ 1390 through 1413). 
 33. Indeed, as the Atlantic Marine Court itself stated in a related context, “[w]hether venue is 
‘wrong’ or ‘improper’ depends exclusively on whether the court in which the case is brought satisfies 
the requirements of federal venue laws, and those provisions say nothing about a forum-selection 
clause.” Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577 (emphasis added). Accord id. (“This question—whether venue 
is ‘wrong’ or ‘improper’—is generally governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 . . . . Whether the parties entered 
into a contract containing a forum-selection clause has no bearing on whether a case falls into one of 
the categories listed in § 1391(b).”). See also 14D Wright et al., supra note 4, § 3801 (“‘Venue’ refers 
to locality, the place where a lawsuit should be heard according to the applicable statutes or rules.”). 
 34. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text (discussing these factors). 
 35. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (“A plaintiff sometimes is under 
temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary, 
even at some inconvenience to himself.”); 15 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3841 (3d ed. 2007) (“Section 1404(a) allows the district court to make a particularized 
determination, under all of the circumstances of an individual case, on where it can most, or at least 
more, conveniently be tried.”). 
 36. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580 (“Section 1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens for the subset of cases in which the transferee forum is within the federal court 
system; in such cases, Congress has replaced the traditional remedy of outright dismissal with transfer.”). 
 37. Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 763 (2011). 
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proper38—but also to any district “to which all parties have consented.”39 
The Atlantic Marine Court seemed to suggest that this new “consent” 
language refers to (or at least includes) precommencement forum-
selection clauses.40 But this reading of § 1404(a) is almost certainly 
incorrect. Though the legislative history accompanying the 2011 Act 
appears to be silent on this issue, the better view is that this statute refers 
not to forum-selection clauses, but rather to post-commencement 
agreements to transfer venue. For the term “parties” as used in this 
statute must refer to the parties to the action, which might well include 
persons in addition to those who might be bound by a forum-selection 
clause (and who might not have even been known at the time of the 
making of that contract). This is also the meaning typically assigned to 
the term “parties” in the federal procedural context,41 and it would make 
little sense to permit an action to be transferred to another district based 
on the “consent” of some of the parties to the action, but not all. 
Moreover, § 1404(a) as amended distinguishes between venues in which 
the action “might have been brought” and those in which it could not 
have been brought but that to which the parties now consent. In a 
situation, such as occurred in Atlantic Marine, in which the venue 
specified in the forum-selection clause is also a venue in which the action 
“might have been brought,” the “consent” provision would seem to be 
superfluous. It is also notable that § 1404(a) refers to the district to which 
all parties “have” (not had) consented, which points more towards 
agreements made post-commencement, rather than at some time in the 
past.42 And in Atlantic Marine, the plaintiff (J-Crew), of course, did not 
 
 38. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1960) (interpreting the phrase “where it might 
have been brought” in § 1404(a) in this manner). 
 39. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
 40. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 579 (opining that § 1404(a) “permits transfer to any district 
where venue is also proper . . . or to any other district to which the parties have agreed by contract or 
stipulation,” and that this statute “therefore provides a mechanism for enforcement of forum-selection 
clauses that point to a particular federal district”). 
 41. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties . . . .”). 
 42. Cf. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 34–35 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Although 
the language of § 1404(a) provides no clear answer [as to whether forum-selection clauses fall within 
its scope], in my view it does provide direction. The provision vests the district courts with authority to 
transfer a civil action to another district ‘for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice.’ This language looks to the present and the future. As the specific reference to convenience of 
parties and witnesses suggests, it requires consideration of what is likely to be just in the future, when 
the case is tried, in light of things as they now stand. Accordingly, the courts in applying § 1404(a) have 
examined a variety of factors, each of which pertains to facts that currently exist or will exist: e.g., the 
forum actually chosen by the plaintiff, the current convenience of the parties and witnesses, the 
current location of pertinent books and records, similar litigation pending elsewhere, current docket 
conditions, and familiarity of the potential court with governing state law. In holding that the validity 
between the parties of a forum-selection clause falls within the scope of § 1404(a), the Court inevitably 
imports, in my view without adequate textual foundation, a new retrospective element into the court’s 
deliberations, requiring examination of what the facts were concerning, among other things, the 
Shannon-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2015 5:08 PM 
April 2015]           ENFORCING FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES 785 
consent to the transfer of the action to the venue specified in the forum-
selection clause (post-commencement, anyway), but rather opposed 
Atlantic Marine’s efforts to do so all the way to the Supreme Court.43 
Because § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) were not designed with forum-
selection clause enforcement in mind, the Atlantic Marine Court’s use of 
these statutes for this purpose results in a mode of analysis that can only 
be described as contrived. The Court began not with the forum-selection 
clause at issue, but rather with a determination of whether venue—
without regard to the forum-selection clause—was proper or improper in 
the forum where the action was commenced.44 The Court then modified 
the analysis typically used in this context, first by eliminating the 
plaintiff’s “venue privilege,”45 and then by reading § 1404(a)’s triggering 
condition—“for the convenience of the parties and witnesses”—out of 
that provision.46 The Court concluded by acknowledging that § 1404(a) 
applies only when the forum-selection clause points to another federal 
forum; when it points to a state or foreign court, an entirely different 
procedural device—forum non conveniens—is required.47 
The anomalous results potentially produced by the Court’s scheme 
provide further evidence that these statutes are inapt in this context. 
Atlantic Marine, in at least one sense, was a fairly simple case: venue was 
proper not only in the district where the action was commenced, but also 
in the district specified in the forum-selection clause, meaning that the 
latter presumably was a district where the action “might have been 
brought” under § 1404(a), and therefore was a potential transferee court. 
But other possibilities and combinations are possible. For example, what 
 
bargaining power of the parties and the presence or absence of overreaching at the time the contract 
was made.” (original alteration and citation omitted)). 
 43. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576.  
A leading treatise alternatively (and persuasively) suggests that this amendment to § 1404(a) 
was actually made in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman v. Blaski. See 17 James 
Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 111.12[1][c] (3d ed. 2014) (“Before the statutory change, 
courts could not consider the defendant’s consent to the transferee venue because transfer was 
authorized only to a court where the action ‘might have been brought.’ In Hoffman v. Blaski, the 
Supreme Court ruled that a lack of proper venue in the proposed transferee district precluded 
transfer. The court went on to state that transfer was unauthorized on the additional ground that the 
transferee court could not have asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant at the time the action 
was initially filed. . . . [L]ower courts were required to follow Hoffman v. Blaski’s rule that the 
transferee court must have personal jurisdiction independent of the defendant’s consent, until this rule 
was abrogated by the 2011 amendment.”). 
 44. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577. 
 45. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 46. See supra note 23. 
 47. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 579–80; see also Ryan T. Holt, Note, A Uniform System for the 
Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1913, 1930 (2009) (“If 
parties have a general right to select their own forum for litigation ex ante and to have that forum 
honored by the court, it seems odd to employ a procedural mechanism that automatically cuts out the 
majority of potential forums in the country.”). 
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if the forum-selection clause instead had provided that all disputes were 
to be litigated in a federal district in which venue, under § 1391, was 
improper (and thus is not a district where the action “might have been 
brought”)? Absent the “consent” of all the parties—which here seems 
unlikely, post-commencement—§ 1404(a) suggests that such an action 
could not be transferred. Does this then mean that the forum-selection 
clause may not be enforced? Or must a district court resort to the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens here also? The answers to these 
questions are unclear.48 What if the plaintiff had commenced an action in 
the forum specified in the clause, a forum that, under § 1391, was 
improper? Section 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) provide that such an action 
must be transferred or dismissed, but that cannot be the correct result in 
all such cases.49 Admittedly, such anomalies, of themselves, do not 
necessarily mean that these statutes are inapplicable or irrelevant in this 
context. Poorly drafted statutes are not unknown. But the problems 
 
 48. Notice also that these same problems arise when enforcement is sought under § 1406(a), 
which uses similar “could have been brought” language. 
 49. Of course, when a plaintiff commences an action in the forum specified in a valid forum-
selection clause, a strong argument can be made that the defendant has waived any objection that 
might otherwise attach to litigating in that forum, and that such waivers, at least as to things such as 
venue, generally will be respected. See, e.g., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) 
(“[N]either personal jurisdiction nor venue is fundamentally preliminary in the sense that subject-
matter jurisdiction is, for both are personal privileges of the defendant, rather than absolute strictures 
on the court, and both may be waived by the parties.”); 14D Wright et al., supra note 4, § 3801 
(“Because venue is for the convenience of litigants it is a personal privilege of the defendants and can 
be waived by them.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, when one insists on analyzing forum-selection clause 
enforcement by determining first whether venue is proper or improper without regard to that clause, 
one is led down a very dubious path.  
And the questions do not stop here. Consider, for example, the following summary of the 
current state of the law here, again from a leading treatise in this area: 
  The first question is whether the district court will enforce a forum selection clause when 
an action is filed in a district permitted by the clause, but that district is not a proper venue 
under the applicable venue statute. Courts generally will enforce the agreement. In the first 
place, defendants may waive objection to venue. Second, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that it generally will enforce such agreements. Thus, when a defendant moves to dismiss a case 
when a plaintiff has invoked a forum selection clause, courts generally will deny the motion. 
  The second question is whether the district court will enforce the forum selection clause 
at the insistence of the defendant when the plaintiff chooses a different, but otherwise 
proper, forum under the applicable venue provisions. . . . If an action is brought in a forum 
that is proper under the venue stat[utes], but a valid forum selection clause requires that the 
action be maintained in another forum, then a party may seek to enforce the clause through 
a motion for convenience transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). When a party files such a 
motion, the district court should transfer the case unless extraordinary circumstances 
unrelated to the convenience of the parties clearly disfavor a transfer. 
17 Moore, supra note 43, § 110.01[4][b] (footnotes omitted). But why, precisely, should the Court’s 
approach differ in these situations? Again, the answer is not entirely clear. 
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associated with the use of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) do seem to point in 
that direction, or at least suggest the need for an alternative.50 
A related concern pertains to the remedies dictated by the use of 
these statutes. Again, according to the Atlantic Marine Court, if venue is 
proper, only a transfer to another district is possible,51 whereas if venue is 
improper, the district court may transfer or dismiss.52 It is difficult, 
though, to see why the nature of the remedy here should turn on the 
propriety of venue in the district where the action was commenced. In 
particular, it is difficult to see why, when venue is proper, a defendant’s 
remedy should be limited to a transfer of venue. This is almost certainly not 
the defendant’s preferred remedy—and indeed, in Atlantic Marine, the 
defendant initially moved for dismissal.53 Only in the alternative did it 
move to transfer the action to the forum specified in the clause.54 
Second, irrespective of whether the Atlantic Marine Court’s 
approach to enforcing forum-selection clauses is right or wrong as an 
interpretative matter, it certainly has resulted in a very complicated 
scheme. Following Atlantic Marine, we now have two lines of analysis 
for motions to transfer venue under § 1404(a): one for actions that 
involve forum-selection clauses, and another for actions that do not.55 
But this assumes venue is proper; if it is improper, forum-selection clause 
enforcement presumably would be analyzed under § 1406(a) or Rule 
12(b)(3), thus similarly necessitating at least two lines of analysis under 
one or both of these provisions. On the other hand, if venue is proper, 
but the forum-selection clause points to a state or foreign forum, the 
clause should be enforced under a modified version of the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens—meaning two lines of analysis in that area as 
well.56 As Justice Antonin Scalia once quipped, albeit in another context, 
 
 50. See David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection 
Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 973, 1033 (2008) (“The migration of contract into 
procedure will inevitably require courts to apply existing mechanisms that are ill-suited for the task of 
giving appropriate effect to parties’ agreements.”). 
 51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
 52. See § 1406(a). 
 53. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 576 (2013). 
 54. See id. It also might be observed that where, under § 1404(a) or § 1406(a), a transfer is 
available, the court in which the action was commenced potentially must decide two issues: (1) 
whether it should grant the motion, and (2) if so, where the action should be transferred. Though this 
mode of analysis might be unavoidable in the venue transfer context, it generally seems preferable to 
defer to the forum specified in the clause as to the latter determination. 
 55. As some have observed, the more “traditional” § 1404 analysis—the starting point of the 
Court’s forum-selection clause analysis—is itself something of a mess. See, e.g., David E. Steinberg, 
The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 443, 462 (1990) 
(concluding that the Supreme Court “has failed to provide standards that will result in predictable and 
consistent transfer decisions”). Though the propriety of that analysis is beyond the scope of this 
Article, its incoherence does not make the analysis here any easier. 
 56. This expansion in the use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens seems particularly 
surprising given the Court’s earlier statement that this doctrine “has continuing application only in 
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“Ockham is offended by today’s decision, even if no one else is.”57 
Certainly, law can be complicated, and if the proper means of enforcing 
such a clause necessitates complexity, its convoluted nature would be 
unavoidable (even if unfortunate). Here, though, one gets the sense that 
the complexity is largely self-inflicted. 
Yet another concern is whether a § 1404/§ 1406/forum non 
conveniens-type analysis, even as modified by the Court in Atlantic 
Marine, fully captures all of the factors that might be considered 
relevant—and fully discards those considered irrelevant—when 
determining whether to enforce a forum-selection clause. In theory, a 
court could take any one of several approaches, and where it might fall 
along this continuum depends in large part on the court’s view of party 
preference.58 At one extreme, a court could refuse to enforce them, but 
the Court quite clearly has rejected that approach. At the other extreme, 
a court could enforce them across the board. Though the Court seems to 
have rejected that approach as well, the language used in its opinions on this 
subject suggests that its current attitude is something very close to this.59  
But to the extent such clauses are not enforceable in all cases, what 
are the factors a court should use to make this determination? Though 
the Court’s “extraordinary circumstances” standard60 might not provide 
a complete answer, its current analysis seems to be limited to the “public-
interest” portion of a traditional venue transfer/forum non conveniens 
analysis, which (again) consists primarily of considerations relating to 
 
cases where the alternative forum is abroad.” Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2 
(1994). Though the Court, in dicta, might have since reopened the door to the use of this doctrine as to 
state courts, see Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007) (opining 
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens “perhaps” applies “in rare instances where a state or 
territorial court serves litigation convenience best”), the Atlantic Marine Court apparently has taken 
the use of this doctrine to a new level. Moreover, the Court’s effort to homogenize the forum-selection 
clause enforcement procedure as between venue transfer statutes and the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens arguably has resulted in inappropriate changes to the latter. See generally Robin Effron, 
Atlantic Marine and the Future of Forum Non Conveniens, 66 Hastings L.J. 693 (2015). Finally, the 
Court’s expanded reliance on forum non conveniens assumes that the use of this common-law doctrine 
is proper in any context, and arguably, it is not. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, 
and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1147 
(arguing that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is unconstitutional); see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 517 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Whether the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens is good or bad, I should wait for Congress to adopt it.”). 
 57. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 217 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 216 
(criticizing the “novel regime that the Court adopts today, which will apparently require the development of 
new rules from scratch”). 
 58. See generally Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party Preference, 66 Hastings 
L.J. 675 (2015). 
 59. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also 14D Wright et al., supra note 4, § 3803.1 
(“Today, the common understanding is that [forum-selection clauses] are prima facie valid and should 
be enforced unless enforcement is shown to be unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular 
contract. . . . Generally, a strongly hospitable judicial attitude toward these clauses prevails.”). 
 60. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013). 
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court congestion, the local interest in the controversy, and the court’s 
familiarity with the relevant substantive law.61 Is this the best we can do? 
The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Article,62 but if 
the answer is “no,” then this is further evidence that § 1404(a) and 
§ 1406(a) are inapposite in this context.63 
Moreover, though the Atlantic Marine Court made some reference 
to Supreme Court precedent in this area, it failed to fully reconcile the 
approach adopted in this case with that taken in earlier cases. For 
example, one of the cases cited by the Court was M/S Bremen v. Zapata 
Off-Shore Co.64 In Bremen, the Court stated that a forum-selection 
clause generally should be enforced unless the opposing party “could clearly 
show that enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, or that the 
clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”65 And in 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, the Court reaffirmed that “a court 
concerned with the enforceability of such a clause must begin its analysis 
with [Bremen] where this Court held that forum-selection clauses . . . are 
‘prima facie valid.’”66 Though Bremen and Carnival Cruise Lines were 
admiralty cases, whereas subject-matter jurisdiction in Atlantic Marine 
(as well as in Stewart) was based on diversity of citizenship,67 it is not clear 
that this is a distinction that should make a difference. One leading 
treatise explains: 
The procedure required by Stewart for evaluating forum selection 
clauses differs sharply from that required in M/S Bremen and Carnival 
Cruise. The combined rule of these cases is that a federal court sitting 
in admiralty jurisdiction should apply a forum selection clause if it is 
“reasonable,” but a federal court sitting in diversity or federal question 
jurisdiction should take the clause into account only as one element in 
the balancing test required by Section 1404(a), provided only that the 
 
 61. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 62. For a thoughtful starting point, though, see Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 376–78 
(7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (concluding, on the one hand, that parties acting in contravention of a 
forum-selection clause “were compensated in advance for bearing the burden of which they now 
complain, and will reap a windfall if they are permitted to repudiate the . . . clause,” but recognizing 
that the enforcement of certain clauses “could interfere with the orderly allocation of judicial business 
and injure other third-party interests (that is, interests of persons other than the parties to the contract 
containing the clause)”). A clause pointing to a foreign court might lead to additional considerations, 
such as those relating to due process and the effectiveness of any relief that might be obtained. 
 63. One might suppose that the Court’s modified § 1404(a) analysis could be modified further, 
and that additional factors could be added or subtracted; after all, the Court, perhaps hedging, stated 
only that its “public-interest” factors “may include” such considerations. At some point, though, this 
(again) suggests the need for an alternative procedure. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.6. 
 64. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582. 
 65. 407 U.S. at 15. The Court further suggested that “[a] contractual choice-of-forum clause 
should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in 
which suit is brought” and (perhaps) “if the chosen forum is seriously inconvenient for the trial of the 
action.” Id. at 15–16. 
 66. 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) (citation omitted). 
 67. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576. 
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clause does not mandate a state forum. This distinction in the 
procedure followed in admiralty and non-admiralty cases is no doubt 
curious, especially given that the rule governing the transfer of venue 
in admiralty cases is closely modeled on Section 1404(a), which 
controls in diversity and federal question cases. The most likely 
explanation for the Supreme Court’s bifurcated approach to forum 
selection clause analysis is that the Erie doctrine, which is central to the 
reasoning of Stewart, has no application in admiralty law. . . . And yet, 
the distinction is even more confusing because the Court in Carnival 
Cruise does not highlight the significance of admiralty jurisdiction to its 
analysis and the Court never has explained the underlying rationale for 
its bifurcated approach.68 
A final concern relates to the fact that the Court’s forum-selection 
clause enforcement procedure—a procedure that relies heavily on the 
use of federal venue transfer statutes—has no applicability in state 
courts. It is unclear why the proper procedure for the enforcement of a 
forum-selection clause should vary significantly between federal and state 
courts; aside from the fact that the latter might not be able to effectuate 
an out-of-state transfer, there is no obvious reason why there should be 
much of a difference (and of course, to the extent there is a significant 
difference, that is one more complicating factor in this area as a whole). 
As for the approach proposed by the amicus: Undoubtedly, a 
defendant seeking to enforce a forum-selection clause could plead some 
sort of defense relating to the impropriety of the forum selected by the 
plaintiff. But assuming that there is a coherent distinction between the 
validity of a forum-selection clause and its enforcement,69 Rule 12(b)(6) 
does not seem to provide the appropriate procedure for accomplishing the 
latter. Rule 12(b)(6) appears to be reserved for the enforcement of merits-
based defenses, as opposed to what might be termed (for lack of a better 
word) procedural defenses, such as the enforcement of a forum-selection 
clause, an issue that has nothing to do with the merits, but rather relates 
only to the identity of the proper forum.70 It was for this reason, at least 
 
 68. 14D Wright et al., supra note 4, § 3803.1 (footnotes omitted); see also id. (“Not surprisingly, 
given this confusion surrounding forum-selection clause analysis, many lower federal courts have 
failed to distinguish between the approach taken in Carnival Cruise and that taken in Stewart. There 
thus has developed a general jurisprudence that has not been responsive to the differences between 
these approaches.”). 
 69. Though this Article only assumes this to be true, the Atlantic Marine Court seemed to agree. 
See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576, 581 n.5 (observing that “there was no dispute that the forum-
selection clause was valid,” and that its analysis “presupposes a contractually valid forum-selection 
clause”); see also Clermont, supra note 2, at 646–50 (similarly discussing this distinction). 
 70. See, e.g., Albany Ins. Co. v. Almacenadora Somex, S.A., 5 F.3d 907, 909 n.3 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(“Although [Defendant] called it a motion for summary judgment, the motion did not raise an 
objection or defense to the merits of [Plaintiff’s] complaint, nor did it attack the factual basis of the 
allegations contained therein. Moreover, at the time of its motion, [Defendant] had no defensive 
pleading on file. The motion simply requested the court to enforce the forum clauses and dismiss [Plaintiff’s] 
suit without prejudice to refile in Mexico.”). See also Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva Zapata!: Toward 
a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 422, 
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in part, that the Court considered the issue in Atlantic Marine to be one 
of federal (rather than state) law,71 a conclusion that seemingly would be 
true regardless of the nature of the Court’s enforcement mechanism.72 It 
is also for this reason, at least in part, that the Court did not consider this 
issue to be one for the jury,73 and why the dismissal of an action on this 
ground should not preclude the recommencement of the same action in a 
more appropriate court (which in this context, of course, is the entire 
point).74 
Though it might be possible that such a clause could alternatively be 
“enforced” by a counterclaim for breach of contract, it does not appear 
that such a procedure would result in any sort of advantage. For one 
thing, though such a defendant might be able to obtain money damages 
or even specific performance (presumably meaning commencement of 
 
446 (1991) (concluding that neither Rule 12(b)(6) nor Rule 56 should be used to enforce a forum-
selection cause because such a clause “is unrelated to the merits of the underlying dispute”). 
 71. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 579 (concluding that “‘federal law . . . governs the District 
Court’s decision whether to give effect to the parties’ forum-selection clause’”) (quoting Stewart Org., 
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988))). 
 72. See 17 Moore, supra note 43, § 111.04[2][b] (“Courts addressing motions to dismiss based on 
forum selection clauses have generally applied federal law . . . as opposed to state law, to the question 
of the enforceability of the clause.”); Clermont, supra note 2, at 650 (concluding that courts should 
apply lex fori as to the enforceability of forum-selection clauses, which in federal courts will generally 
lead to the application of federal law). 
 73. See supra note 30. Cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (recognizing that “if 
subject-matter jurisdiction turns on contested facts, the trial judge may be authorized to review the 
evidence and resolve the dispute on her own,” but that “[i]f satisfaction of an essential element of a 
claim for relief is at issue . . . the jury is the proper trier of contested facts” (citations omitted)). 
 74. By implication, the Court’s decision in Atlantic Marine leaves little doubt in this regard. Cf. 
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432–33 (2007) (describing forum non 
conveniens as a “non-merits ground for dismissal” that “does not entail any assumption by the court of 
substantive law-declaring power,” but rather “denies audience to a case on the merits,” and “is a 
determination that the merits should be adjudicated elsewhere” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
For more on the distinctions between dispositive motions going to the merits (such as a motion under 
Rule 12(b)(6)) and more “procedural”-type dismissals, see Bradley Scott Shannon, Action Is an 
Action Is an Action Is an Action, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 65, 125–35 (2002). 
 Incidentally, the foregoing discussion as to the enforcement of a forum-selection clause does not 
necessarily mean that Rule 12(b)(6) would be inapposite with respect to the question of the validity of 
such a clause, or that state (or even foreign) law would not be implicated in making that 
determination. See Clermont, supra note 2, at 652–54. But those issues likewise are beyond the scope 
of this Article. It does seem, though, the Court’s oblique suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding, 
that the correct procedure as to clause validity should not depend upon the manner in which the clause 
is enforced. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580 n.4 (“We observe, moreover, that a motion under Rule 
12(b)(6), unlike a motion under § 1404(a) or the forum non conveniens doctrine, may lead to a jury 
trial on venue if issues of material fact relating to the validity of the forum-selection clause arise.”). It 
also seems that when one speaks of validity in this context, one must be referring to what might be 
termed contractual validity—that is, things that go to the validity of the contract as a whole—for if 
validity is thought to include anything that might prevent the enforceability of the clause, the one 
would essentially swallow the other. In other words, when ascertaining the limits of validity, the focus 
seemingly should be on the nature of the subject being regulated, and not on the supposed “intent” of 
the law in question. 
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the action in the forum specified in the clause), what the defendant 
probably prefers by way of remedy is a dismissal, not a trial, and sooner, 
rather than later.75 But it also seems that in order to prevail on such a 
counterclaim, the defendant would have to prove, inter alia, that the 
clause was valid and enforceable—which is all that would have to be 
proved in order to prevail on the defense. 
III.  A Better Way: A Motion to Dismiss for  
Enforcement of the Forum-Selection Clause 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, neither the Court’s § 1404/§ 1406/ 
Rule 12(b)(3)/forum non conveniens approach, nor a Rule 12(b)(6)-type 
approach, is the best means of enforcing a forum-selection clause. Though 
federal venue transfer statutes and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
like forum-selection clauses, are in some sense concerned with the 
location of trial, there is almost nothing else about the former that bears 
any relationship to the latter. Likewise, Rule 12(b)(6), which is concerned 
with the merits, is largely inapposite in this context. Fortunately, the 
Atlantic Marine Court did not foreclose the possibility of an 
alternative.76 So, to return to the initial question: how should a forum-
selection clause be enforced? 
Once validity is established, a forum-selection clause should be 
enforced simply by a motion to dismiss for enforcement of the clause.77 
Whether initially presented as a defense in the answer78 or by way of a 
preanswer motion,79 a motion to enforce the clause would allow this issue 
 
 75. Cf. Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 502–03 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that 
“the ‘right not to be sued elsewhere than in Naples’ is not fully vindicated—indeed, to be utterly frank, 
is positively destroyed—by permitting the trial to occur [elsewhere] and reversing its outcome”). 
 76. See, e.g., Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 at 575 (holding that when venue is otherwise proper, “a 
forum-selection clause may be enforced by a motion to transfer under § 1404(a)” (emphasis added)); 
id. at 580 (similarly holding only “that § 1404(a) and the forum non conveniens doctrine provide 
appropriate enforcement mechanisms” (emphasis added)). 
 77. Such a motion, incidentally, is not without some precedent (at least in the nontechnical sense 
of that word). For example, in Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, the defendant appealed the denial of its 
motion to dismiss “on the basis of a contractual forum-selection clause,” 490 U.S. at 496, and there is 
no indication in the Court’s opinion that anyone took issue with this characterization; see also 
Lederman, supra note 70, at 466 (discussing the possibility of a “‘motion to dismiss based on the 
forum-selection clause’ without citing a particular statute or rule,” though not as an exclusive means of 
enforcement). Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (suggesting that dismissal is the preferred procedural vehicle 
(if not also the preferred remedy) for addressing procedural deficiencies). 
 78. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(A) (requiring a defendant to “state in short and plain terms its 
defenses to each claim asserted against it”). 
 79. See 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1349 (3d. ed. 2004) (“Although the seven motions specifically enumerated in Rule 12(b) theoretically 
are the only motions that can be made prior to service of the responsive pleading, in reality the 
preliminary-motion practice in federal courts has a much broader compass.”). 
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to be resolved at the earliest possible time.80 More importantly, such a 
motion would solve virtually all of the problems associated with the 
Court’s current scheme. In particular, the utilization of a motion to 
dismiss for enforcement of a forum-selection clause would obviate the 
need for a modified § 1404/§ 1406 analysis, thus returning those statutes 
to their original (and sole) purpose: to permit the transfer of venue to 
another court within the federal district court system. It also would allow 
for the creation of a mode of analysis tailored specifically to the concerns 
associated with enforcement of such clauses—that is, one that more 
effectively strikes the appropriate balance of competing policy 
considerations in this context.  
The approach proposed in this Article would result in “horizontal” 
uniformity across all federal cases, regardless of the basis for subject-
matter jurisdiction, the propriety of venue, and whether the clause in 
question points to a federal or nonfederal forum. It also holds the 
promise of achieving “vertical” uniformity between the procedure 
adopted in federal courts and that likely to be used in state courts. 
As some have observed, a motion to dismiss for enforcement of the 
forum-selection clause enforcement is not specifically mentioned in the 
Rules, nor is it provided for by federal statute. But the Rules expressly 
recognize that not all defenses have been named therein,81 and in any 
event, the same could be said of a dismissal under the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, a procedure the Court seems to wholeheartedly embrace. 
And though the remedy here might be limited to a dismissal—whereas 
under the current scheme a transfer might be possible, at least within the 
federal system—a plaintiff in this situation, having acted in apparent 
contravention of the clause, would seem to have little room for complaint.82 
 
 80. See id. (“These seven defenses are permitted to be asserted prior to service of the responsive 
pleading because they present preliminary or threshold matters that normally should be adjudicated early 
in the action. That is because, if successful, a Rule 12(b) challenge usually will dispose of the pending case, 
although the dismissal generally is not on the merits and does not prevent amendment of the complaint or 
reassertion of the claim in the same or a different court if the defect can be cured. Except for grants of 
motions under subdivision (b)(6) given certain circumstance, a successful Rule 12(b) challenge also does 
not prohibit the plaintiff’s institution of a new action in another court. Thus, the rationale underlying 
recognition of these seven exceptions to the basic policy of the federal rules against dilatory or 
preliminary motions is that motions on the grounds enumerated in Rule 12(b) are likely to produce an 
overall savings in time and resources as well as avoid delay in the disposition of cases, thereby benefitting 
both the parties and the courts.” (footnotes omitted)). Precisely the same reasoning applies here. 
 81. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) (providing that the universe of affirmative defenses only 
“includ[es]” those listed in that rule). 
 82. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 n.8 (2013) (“[W]hen the plaintiff 
has violated a contractual obligation by filing suit in a forum other than the one specified in a valid forum-
selection clause . . . dismissal would work no injustice on the plaintiff.”). This is not to say that a transfer here 
also might be possible; though also not expressly authorized by Rule or statute, such a transfer would be no 
more “lawless” than the Court’s current use of forum non conveniens, and might well be more just. 
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